Stalin's War: A New History of World War II
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- Author：Sean McMeekin
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Summary
A major new history of the Second World War by a prize-winning historian
We remember World War II as a struggle between good and evil， with Hitler propelling events and the Allied powers saving the day。 But Hitler's armies did not fight in multiple theaters， his empire did not span the Eurasian continent， and he did not inherit the spoils of war。 That role belonged to Joseph Stalin。 Hitler's genocidal ambition may have unleashed Armageddon， but as celebrated historian Sean McMeekin shows， the conflicts that emerged were the result of Stalin's maneuverings， orchestrated to unleash a war between capitalist powers in Europe and between Japan and the Anglo-American forces in the Pacific。 Meanwhile， the United States and Britain's self-defeating strategy of supporting Stalin and his armies at all costs allowed the Soviets to conquer most of Eurasia， from Berlin to Beijing， for Communism。
A groundbreaking reassessment， Stalin's War is essential reading for anyone looking to understand the roots of the current world order。
We remember World War II as a struggle between good and evil， with Hitler propelling events and the Allied powers saving the day。 But Hitler's armies did not fight in multiple theaters， his empire did not span the Eurasian continent， and he did not inherit the spoils of war。 That role belonged to Joseph Stalin。 Hitler's genocidal ambition may have unleashed Armageddon， but as celebrated historian Sean McMeekin shows， the conflicts that emerged were the result of Stalin's maneuverings， orchestrated to unleash a war between capitalist powers in Europe and between Japan and the Anglo-American forces in the Pacific。 Meanwhile， the United States and Britain's self-defeating strategy of supporting Stalin and his armies at all costs allowed the Soviets to conquer most of Eurasia， from Berlin to Beijing， for Communism。
A groundbreaking reassessment， Stalin's War is essential reading for anyone looking to understand the roots of the current world order。
Reviews
Alex MacMillan
，
My issues with this book are summed up quite succinctly on page 421 of Atrocities: The 100 Deadliest Episodes in Human History by Matthew White。 I'm posting a long excerpt from that book so that， unless you also have an ax to grind against FDR， you can save yourself the trouble of reading this tome:No aspect of World War II is without controversy， but some debates burn more energy than others。。。 The big controversies in the English-speaking world challenge the Allies/good， Axis/bad stereotypes o My issues with this book are summed up quite succinctly on page 421 of Atrocities: The 100 Deadliest Episodes in Human History by Matthew White。 I'm posting a long excerpt from that book so that， unless you also have an ax to grind against FDR， you can save yourself the trouble of reading this tome:No aspect of World War II is without controversy， but some debates burn more energy than others。。。 The big controversies in the English-speaking world challenge the Allies/good， Axis/bad stereotypes of official history， either by minimizing the sins of the Axis （the Holocaust， starting the war， for example） or maximizing the sins of the Allies （Stalinism， Dresden， for example）。 In fact， a significant minority openly suggests that the Western democracies fought on the wrong side。。。In this case， revisionists seem to forget that the world went to war against Hitler because he was dangerous， not because he was evil。 This is an important distinction in international relations。 You can do whatever you want inside your own country， but when you start invading your neighbors， the rest of the world gets jumpy。 No matter how brutal Stalin may have been to his own people， he was content to stay inside the borders of the Soviet Union。 By the time Stalin began grabbing small countries for himself， the West was already committed to war with Hitler。 The choice wasn't between fighting Hitler or Stalin。 The choice was to fight Hitler or both of them。。。Furthermore， the Soviets beat the Germans fair and square。 They produced 96 percent of their own munitions and 66 percent of their own vehicles， while inflicting 80 per cent of all German fatalities in the war。 （source） They had already turned the tide at Stalingrad at a time when Britain was stalemated and America was still mobilizing。 It was a close call， and Western assistance tipped the balance， but the West needed Stalin more than Stalin needed the West。 Without the Soviets， the Western allies would have had to face several million more Germans all by themselves。 This gave Stalin a better negotiating position throughout the war。 - June 2021 。。。more
Peter Goodman
，
“Stalin’s War: a new history of World War II，” by Sean McMeekin （Basic， 2021）。 Boy is this a revelatory， disturbing， depressing book。 Long story short: Stalin won World War II by a lot。 He vastly expanded both Soviet territory and influence; he had a large and almost visible influence on British and especially American policy; there were Communist agents throughout the American government structure， including outright spies and sympathizers; Roosevelt was， if not a patsy， remarkably amenable to “Stalin’s War: a new history of World War II，” by Sean McMeekin （Basic， 2021）。 Boy is this a revelatory， disturbing， depressing book。 Long story short: Stalin won World War II by a lot。 He vastly expanded both Soviet territory and influence; he had a large and almost visible influence on British and especially American policy; there were Communist agents throughout the American government structure， including outright spies and sympathizers; Roosevelt was， if not a patsy， remarkably amenable to giving the Russians whatever they wanted， even at the expense of American and British troops。 At the beginning， Stalin and Hitler were sort of working together， especially in dividing up Poland。 Before Barbarossa， Stalin was at the point of attacking Hitler。 He had significantly modernized and updated the Red Army （McMeekin doesn’t touch on how much the army was hurt by the purges）。 His troops were brought right up to the border。 He was getting messages from everywhere that the Nazis were about to invade。 But he was dumbfounded by how badly his armies responded。 Turns out， among other things， that Russian soldiers hated the Commies so much they barely fought， readily surrendered， and easily turned around to fight with the Nazis。 McMeekin describes how vicious， violent， brutal， and merciless the Communists were to their own people。 For one thing， the party ruled that anyone taken prisoner was de facto a traitor and could be executed; not only that， his entire family could be punished。 The Communists routinely tortured anyone they considered their enemies。 They gouged eyes， castrated crucified， burned alive。 They were， he says， worse than Nazis in the treatment even of their own people。 In foreign affairs they routinely bamboozled the western allies; they were rude， insulting， secretive。 Lend-Lease， ah， lend-lease。 The USA sent so much equipment， food， and supplies to the Reds that a huge proportion of Soviet soldiers （and civilians） were kept alive by American rations， traveled in American vehicles， wore American-made uniforms， etc。 The Americans let Russian experts visit their factories copy top-secret documents， export highly sensitive equipment---for nothing。 They basically gave the Russians everything they asked for with nothing in return。 McMeekin says Roosevelt’s terms for the British （bases for destroyers） were extortionate by comparison。 I can barely go on。 He cites Russian documents， diaries， letters， etc。， showing how the Reds manipulated the Americans。 He says top American officials， from Harry Hopkins the hero-worshipper to Harry Dexter White the actual Soviet “asset” directed American behavior and response。 The Reds asked for everything and gave nothing in return。 Ultimately， he says， the reason the USSR emerged from the war heavily industrialized was that the Allies either gave them the factories， plans， and equipment， or they stole it。 I do think he may go overboard: at one point he described Khrushchev’s speech denouncing Stalin as infamous， and that he smeared Stalin。 He argues that the Russians came out completely on top， controlling huge amounts of territory， and even with three votes in the UN general assembly。 On the other hand， of course， the Russians suffered terribly （though even here there are questions: their estimates of casualties rose continually after the war）。 Stunning book。 https://www。basicbooks。com/contributo。。。 。。。more
Theodore Vasilic
，
One of the few bad history books that I have read。 This book sometimes reads more like a polemic than history， and it comes dangerously close to being pro-Axis （such as describing the Hull Note as an “ultimatum”， which it was not， or barely mentioning Nazi crimes in comparison to how much he details Soviet crimes， which to his credit were numerous）。 One case is when he describes Soviet crimes against German POWs， but gives merely a few to German crimes against Soviet POWs， which were far more nu One of the few bad history books that I have read。 This book sometimes reads more like a polemic than history， and it comes dangerously close to being pro-Axis （such as describing the Hull Note as an “ultimatum”， which it was not， or barely mentioning Nazi crimes in comparison to how much he details Soviet crimes， which to his credit were numerous）。 One case is when he describes Soviet crimes against German POWs， but gives merely a few to German crimes against Soviet POWs， which were far more numerous and caused far more deaths （1。6 to 3 million Soviet POW deaths in comparison to 300，000 or so German POW deaths）。The book also has a constant motif of how much Lend-Lease helped the USSR， which is driven home in truly painstaking detail。 There are exhaustive lists of how much supplies were sent to the USSR， which made for extremely boring reading。 I get that he was trying to make a point， but it gets old after a while。 It also makes a few outright historical mistakes， such as ascribing the Soviet victory at Kursk to the Allied landings in Sicily and Italy， which is complete nonsense and is based on the questionable source of Manstein’s memoirs。 It also makes a few minor mistakes in naming and occupation。 It does have a few good sides， in the sense that when it is isn’t polemicizing， it does make for enjoyable reading。 Compared with McMeekin’s other works， though， this one is quite bad。 Two stars。 。。。more
Russel Henderson
，
An intensely important book， if not necessarily a good one。Let's start with the positives。 The author marshals a good deal of data， some relatively novel and others well-trodden but in the service of other arguments， to center the narrative of WWII on Stalin， his motivations， and his decisions。 He's not the first person to do this， but much of Russian historiography still views the Soviet role as a positive， patriotic one and most of the Western historiography still centers the narrative on Hitl An intensely important book， if not necessarily a good one。Let's start with the positives。 The author marshals a good deal of data， some relatively novel and others well-trodden but in the service of other arguments， to center the narrative of WWII on Stalin， his motivations， and his decisions。 He's not the first person to do this， but much of Russian historiography still views the Soviet role as a positive， patriotic one and most of the Western historiography still centers the narrative on Hitler and/or the Anglo-American decision-makers。 The book demonstrates that Stalin was in his own way every bit as voracious as Hitler between 1939 and 1941， in many ways as brutal， and that his decisions helped to bring about Barbarossa。 It suggests， rather convincingly， that Stalin plotted an aggressive war and was not ignorant of German designs in the spring of 1941。 I don't think it convincing that Stalin goaded Hitler into war， but he does suggest that Stalin's aggression in Eastern Europe， particularly toward Ploesti but also in removing the buffer states， made the decision for Hitler easier。 He demonstrates the centrality of Lend-Lease to the Soviet resistance and counterattacks。 I'm not sure he proves it necessary to the defense of Moscow in 1941， but certainly to Stalingrad and to the counterattacks on 1942 and into 1943。 He may oversell on this point， but if he does so it is because the Soviet and Russian historians have chronically underrated the importance of American material aid。 The advantage that Russia had over the Germans in motorized transport - trucks in particular - was American-supplied。 And America diverted much of her manufacturing and shipping capabilities from other theaters and other allies to make it happen。 He rightly acknowledges the impact of aid on the margins， especially in a clash of two military juggernauts。 McMeekin seems to fall into the same trap as every rightish historian on the subject in identifying Soviet assets at or near British or American decision-making and inferring a dark and outsized influence， but certainly the Harry Dexter Whites and Guy Burgesses of the Allies did not help matters。 The rise of Tito in Yugoslavia vis a vis the Chetniks is more complex than McMeekin acknowledges， and while the Cambridge Five probably didn't help he affords them more agency than they deserve。He succeeded as well in showing the abject ingratitude and inflexibility of Stalin regarding such aid， how he dictated terms of something to which he had no claim and over which he had little leverage save the threat of separate peace。 He demonstrated the impact of Soviet-Japanese rapprochement on Stalin's decisions （and on Japanese behavior， for that matter）， something Western historians often address little if at all。 I loathe counterfactuals， but McMeekin demonstrates persuasively that it didn't have to be that way， especially in Asia; that the obsequiousness of Roosevelt and especially Hopkins helped consign tens of millions of Eastern Europeans and Asians to decades of Communist tyranny （in some cases it is still ongoing）。 They had a good deal more leverage than they were willing to exercise early， and virtually everything Stalin did from 1941 through the end of the war could have been anticipated by men who took Stalin's career to date seriously， and that Roosevelt made that impossible when he sidelined the men who did so。 Stalin was acting in conformity with character; it was Roosevelt and Hopkins who were to blame for pretending he was otherwise。 McMeekin demonstrates， as many before him have done， that Stalin's conduct of the war beginning in 1939 was brutal and despicable on a world-historical scale， and that the presence of Hitler and some attendant ideological blinkers are what prevent popular memory from acknowledging as much。 The book suffered from a fatal flaw， however， in that it was utterly obtuse。 There are alternative explanations for so many of the decisions that McMeekin chalks up to Stalin's malevolence and Western toadying。 Blaming the Morgenthau Plan for Nazi resistance and for the Ardennes Offensive is the post hoc fallacy in action。 There is no specific causal relationship between the two and based on timelines barely a correlation between them。 The presence of Soviet pawns in the decision-making on China did not help matters （and his analysis of Soviet efforts in Manchuria and Korea is much more persuasive）， but suggesting that Chiang was not in fact corrupt and not in many ways the agent of his own demise is at odds with even sympathetic takes on the man。 Attacking the oil fields at Baku and inviting open war with Stalin before Barbarossa would have had intense， negative impacts on the British home front， which was close to united in its hatred of Nazism but lacked that universal hatred for Soviet communism。 So in summation， an important book， one that might have had an impact on par with AJP Taylor had it come out a few decades ago。 A corrective for a popular understanding that wants to portray Stalin's Soviet Union as largely a victim in the war when the country was absorbing and brutalizing its neighbors at the war's beginning and the war's end。 But not a definitive history。 。。。more
John Bohnert
，
Wow！ I learned a great deal from this fascinating book。
Eric Lee
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Sean McMeekin is an interesting historian and has written some fascinating books encouraging the rest of us to take a new look at things like the Russian Revolution or the Communist International。 This door-stopper of a book is similarly ambitious — urging us to rethink of the Second World War as one that had only one victor: Josef Stalin。Of course there are points to be made in favour of that argument， but McMeekin’s book seems far more of a polemic than a history。 He has several villains （Harr Sean McMeekin is an interesting historian and has written some fascinating books encouraging the rest of us to take a new look at things like the Russian Revolution or the Communist International。 This door-stopper of a book is similarly ambitious — urging us to rethink of the Second World War as one that had only one victor: Josef Stalin。Of course there are points to be made in favour of that argument， but McMeekin’s book seems far more of a polemic than a history。 He has several villains （Harry Hopkins， FDR’s aide comes to mind） and hardly any heroes。 There is an enormous amount of information about how the US armed Stalin at the expense of everyone else （the Chinese nationalists were in the end left to fend for themselves）。 McMeekin’s account is full of statistics about how many Dodge trucks arrived in Vladivostok， or how much butter and eggs the US contributed to the Soviet war effort。 FDR comes off as a Soviet dupe， and Churchill fares little better。 And the Germans — remember them？ They get hardly a mention。The book ends with McMeekin questioning whether the war needed to happen at all。 He suggests possible deals the US could have done with Japan to prevent conflict， and builds a case against the doctrine of “unconditional surrender” that the US and the USSR imposed on Nazi Germany。 He thinks US support for the USSR following the German invasion in June 1941 was a mistake and it would have served Western interests to allow the two sides to fight it out。 （Of course with his crediting US aid as the only thing that propped up the Soviet regime， he does seem to prefer an inevitable Nazi victory on the eastern front to what actually happened。）Though he acknowledges the barbarism of the Nazi regime （how could he not？） the level of detail is as nothing compared to McMeekin’s accounts of the sufferings （and they were genuine） of the peoples who came under Soviet rule by 1945。 Offhand comments in the very final pages of the book about the loss of civil liberties in the US place the author dangerously close to the isolationist right wing of 1939-41 in the US， as does his constant reminders of how very awful FDR was。I wish I could have liked this book more， but it is， despite all the footnotes and all the research， a superficial and very biased account of the war and I cannot recommend it。 。。。more
Dennis R
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This is an important book for anyone interested in history， the history of WWII， of Communism and or Marxist thought。 It will be an eye opener to many given the woeful state of historical context in the United States and the rush to make 1984 a reality。McMeekin， with meticulous research and painstaking detail outlines the role Stalin played in the war and concludes that far from the so called 'good war' being an unalloyed victory for freedom and the west's cherished ideals it was in fact a near This is an important book for anyone interested in history， the history of WWII， of Communism and or Marxist thought。 It will be an eye opener to many given the woeful state of historical context in the United States and the rush to make 1984 a reality。McMeekin， with meticulous research and painstaking detail outlines the role Stalin played in the war and concludes that far from the so called 'good war' being an unalloyed victory for freedom and the west's cherished ideals it was in fact a near total win for Stalin， communism and in fact accomplished many of goals of Nazism。 The victory we handed Stalin resulted in the expenditure of trillions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives to fight the Cold War， not to mention the emotional distress of 50 years of living under the cloud of nuclear destruction。At every turn， the United States and England sold out their allies， including Poland whose invasion by Germany was the putative cause of the war。 One of the other revelations is that when Joe McCarthy claimed there were 250 Russian spies in the State Department he was wrong。 There were more and they weren't all at State。 The influence of Harry Dexter White， who was a Soviet Agent， in forming the Morgenthau Memo about how Germany should be treated post war so unified the nearly defeated Germans that it lead to increased resistance and probably cost the US 10，000 dead。Stalin played the west like a chess master always focused the future; where he would end up while the west seemed unable， or really unwilling to confront him。 He was immeasurably aided by those outright agents in the English and English government as well as what Lenin called useful idiots who while not in the employ of Stalin were sympathy with Russian communism。 Many of those were similar to those of today who quest for some utopia without any understanding that utopias violate human nature and can only be realized by totalitarian measures。 Extremists at the far ends of the political spectrum all use the same methods extreme politics are all collectivist and totalitarian。It is worthwhile book to read when considering some of the political players in the world like China who for all their embrace of the west， are driven by the same Marxist claptrap as Stalin。 In the end they all strive for the destruction of anything other than their ideology and that same belief system is now part and parcel of domestic movements promising redress of grievance， in return asking only the souls of their followers。 。。。more
Mathieu Gaudreault
，
A masterpieceThis well researched book（the author used russians， americans， turkish， germans and british archives） debunks many myths and ask may questions。The first myth is that Stalin wasn't an agressive dictator。 Stalin attacked Finland without being provoked， swallowed the Baltic contries， tooks parts of Rumania and invaded Poland after the germans defeated the main polish armed forces。 Actually Germany was an economic Russian vassal 。 Germany depended on Russians oil， minerals and wheat。 Ev A masterpieceThis well researched book（the author used russians， americans， turkish， germans and british archives） debunks many myths and ask may questions。The first myth is that Stalin wasn't an agressive dictator。 Stalin attacked Finland without being provoked， swallowed the Baltic contries， tooks parts of Rumania and invaded Poland after the germans defeated the main polish armed forces。 Actually Germany was an economic Russian vassal 。 Germany depended on Russians oil， minerals and wheat。 Even if Hitler wanted the Ukraine as stated in Meinf Kampf it was the meeting he had with soviet foreign comissar Molotv that crystalized Hitler decision to invade the USSR。 Molotov on behalf of Stalin didn't just want naval bases in Turkey， but also military bases in Bulgaria， Germany to withdraw its military forces from Finland Petsamo nickel mines and an international comission on the Danuble。 Also this book show that FDR was at the same time a fool and a schemer。 FDR found way to intervene in European affaire， sent Donovan to toppel the Yogoslav goverment who signed the Tripartite pact， already sent leand lease（supplies and weapons to USSR） already in July 1941 and was in a undecalred war in the atlantic between the US Navy and the Kriegsmarine U boats。 As the authors mentions with the declassified Verona papers， there were 329 sosivets agents in the US Goverment and some like Harry Dexter White actually having an influence on FDR administration。The authors shows that lend lease saved the USSR who was at the time a poorly industralized nation（except for its military ）。 Soviets relied on the US oil， aluminium ， foodstuff（from butter， spam to even allowing soviets fishermans to fish crab on US west coast）， trucks， jeeps， planes（the soviets specially liked the Kitty hawks and the Douglas A-20） ， tanks， boots， machinery， cranes， engines， locomotives and even uranium ore！ Also the authors debunks the communist and the authorian leader Putin claim that Russian won the war againts the nazis only by themslefs。 With now acces to better sources， the germans actually won at Porochovka（tranformed by the Soviets and afterward Putin's propaganda as the greatest tnak battle of history） where of 300 germans panzers less than 70 were destroyed and the Red Army actually lost 400 of 900 tanks。 The german retreated at Kursk because the Anglo-Americans had landed in Sicily（Operation Husly） and many divisions had to be transfered to Italy。 Also theA masterpiece Well researched with an extensive bibliography。 Also this book show that FDR was at the same time a fool and a schemer。 FDR found way to intervene in European affaire， sent Donovan to toppel the Yogoslav goverment who signed the Tripartite pact， already sent leand lease（supplies and weapons to USSR） already in July 1941 and was in a undecalred war in the atlantic between the US Navy and the Kriegsmarine U boats。 As the authors mentions with the declassified Verona papers， there were 329 sosivets agents in the US Goverment and some like Harry Dexter White actually having an influence on FDR administration。The authors shows that lend lease saved the USSR who was at the time a poorly industralized nation（except for its military ）。 Soviets relied on the US oil， aluminium ， foodstuff（from butter， spam to even allowing soviets fishermans to fish crab on US west coast）， trucks， jeeps， planes（the soviets specially liked the Kitty hawks and the Douglas A-20） ， tanks， boots， machinery， cranes， engines， locomotives and even uranium ore！ Also the authors debunks the communist and the authorian leader Putin claim that Russian won the war againts the nazis only by themslefs。 With now acces to better sources， the germans actually won at Porochovka（tranformed by the Soviets and afterward Putin's propaganda as the greatest tnak battle of history） where of 300 germans panzers less than 70 were destroyed and the Red Army actually lost 400 of 900 tanks。 The german retreated at Kursk because the Anglo-Americans had landed in Sicily（Operation Husly） and many divisions had to be transfered to Italy。 Also the Wermacht ahd to fight an air war over Europe， garrison Norway， France， the Balkans and before send troops to Tunisia （wich by the way 250 000 axis troops were captured at Tunis and the Luftwaffe ahd to supply the Tunisian brighead at the same time at the Stalingrad disaster）and Italy afterward。FDR unconditional surender policy lenghted the war， stiffened german soldiers to fight to the last and extended the destruction and suffering of Europe。 At the same time Stalin was sending peace feelers to Hitler to stop the war in the East and go back to their Octrober 1939 borders。 Hitler actually brooke off the negotiations in Sweden 。 Also the Soviets were not a war with Imperial Japan and trading leand lease oil for Japan Indonesian rubber。 。。。more
Cam Nelson
，
Don't believe the hype about this book！ McMeekin's latest work is very uneven and quite sloppy at times。 I am a fan of McMeekin's previous books on the Ottomans and the Russian Revolution， however， in this work he too often strays into polemics and greatly overstates his case。 Particularly frustrating for me though were some of the outdated and very weakly sourced points for some of his arguments， notably about Operation Citadel being halted solely due to the Allied invasion of Sicily。 To make t Don't believe the hype about this book！ McMeekin's latest work is very uneven and quite sloppy at times。 I am a fan of McMeekin's previous books on the Ottomans and the Russian Revolution， however， in this work he too often strays into polemics and greatly overstates his case。 Particularly frustrating for me though were some of the outdated and very weakly sourced points for some of his arguments， notably about Operation Citadel being halted solely due to the Allied invasion of Sicily。 To make this point， he only cites Manstein's memoirs which are far from being an entirely credible source。 Furthermore， parts of the book are just clearly sloppy and should have been looked over better。 For example， he states that CIGS Alan Brooke was an airman at one point， says that Secretary of State for Air Archibald Sinclair was an Air marshal， and comically writes Alexander Haig when he means to write Douglas Haig。 To be sure， McMeekin makes many good points especially during the section of the book dealing with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the lead up to Barbarossa， but his points can also be found in other recent books by Roger Moorehouse most notably。 。。。more
Marks54
，
Sean McMeekin has written a one volume history of WW2 from the perspective of Stalin and the Soviet Union。 In doing so， he makes good use of newly available Soviet archives， as well as updated research on a variety of aspects of the war。 The result is an engaging and sharply toned view of the war that differs from other approaches， which have focused on the US or Britain。There is so much going on in the book that it is hard to usefully examine it as a whole。 Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s an Sean McMeekin has written a one volume history of WW2 from the perspective of Stalin and the Soviet Union。 In doing so， he makes good use of newly available Soviet archives， as well as updated research on a variety of aspects of the war。 The result is an engaging and sharply toned view of the war that differs from other approaches， which have focused on the US or Britain。There is so much going on in the book that it is hard to usefully examine it as a whole。 Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s was fascinating on its own terms but in this book it highlights a clear headed Stalin’s view of how to position the USSR and the revolution given the accelerating conflicts and crises in Europe leading up to 1939。 The Nazi-Soviet Pact has received considerable attention recently and this book continues that emphasis。 What it clearly shows， howeve， is that Stalin had few illusions about Hitler and his eventual attach on the USSR。 Rather than being blindsided， McMeekin shows that the Soviets were just not as talented as the Germans at mobile warfare across a broad front - their learning curve would be steep。 It is hard to depict the Nazi-Soviet wars as being more grim than it has already been depicted。 This is arguably the most horrible war in history where Soviet losses dwarfed those of other combatants。What McMeekin’s book is superb at is its in-depth examination of the US lend-lease program to the Soviets。 The argument is that the US literally “gave away the store” to Stalin so that Soviets troops and civilians could fight and dies versus the Wehrmacht until the US and Britain were ready to join the war。 The account of this is staggering and persuasive about allied contributions in food and material supplies to the Soviet war effort， contributions that the Soviets barely recognized at all。 The punchline of all of this is that US lend-lease giveaways were successful in the short-run， in that the Red Army survived， turned the tide against Hitler， and conquered Eastern Europe， albeit at an horrendous cost。 In the longer term， however， Stalin’s success in his war was a loss in many ways to the other allies。 Poland， the defense of whose sovereignty started WW2 in Europe， ended the war devastated and under the extended tyranny of the USSR。 The desire for US world involvement after WW2 - counter to US isolation after WW1 - was fulfilled at the cost of the Cold War and the threat of nuclear terror and involved a costly war against Japan that could have been avoided but which helped Stalin - and was partially engineered by Stalin’s men in Washington （Operation Snow）。 So Stalin ended up the big winner and it did not need to happen。This book’s argument involves an extensive discussion of the placement of Soviet agents and sympathizers high up in the ranks of FDR’s wartime administration - Harry Dexter White， for example。 The book does not present Harry Hopkins in a sympathetic light either。 In his treatment of Stalin versus FDR versus Churchill， Stalin comes across as evil， but strategically skilled and effective。 Churchill is treated the same as he is in other biographies and there are few surprises。 FDR comes across more as an arrogant but strangely inattentive leader of the free world who let the Soviets take advantage of the US。 While McMeekin comes across as solidly anti-Communist （and has clearly done his homework）， his view of Stalin’s control over Soviet strategy and his effective implementation of that strategy is superb。 Particularly effective in the argument are the long lists of war materials， transport ships and vehicles， and food supplies that were shipped to the USSR at US taxpayer expense。 Towards the end， this is compared with data on the extensive Soviet looting of Germany and Eastern Europe， which is presented in comparable detail with the added notice that the USSR had to pay the shipping expenses for the looted materials while US taxpayers payed for as much or more - and paid for the transportation costs as well。Overall， the book is a must read for WW2 history enthusiasts。 McMeekin is a superb historian and this volume follows his earlier work on WW1 and the Russian Revolution。 It is a long book， but it was a long war。 The chapters are fairly short and crisply written。 If one has the time and interest， the book is well worth reading。 。。。more
A
，
Like other reviewers below， i was （and remain） skeptical about this book's premise （and reason for being）。 However， i am inclined to roll with the author and allow the big oversteps in the interest of his outstanding narrative of lesser reported elements of the ups and downs of the 1939-1941 （pre war） period。 The author traces the course of the eastern european machinations and the surprises of the Finnish war with great subtlety and ultimately to great purpose to show Russian duplicity and sche Like other reviewers below， i was （and remain） skeptical about this book's premise （and reason for being）。 However， i am inclined to roll with the author and allow the big oversteps in the interest of his outstanding narrative of lesser reported elements of the ups and downs of the 1939-1941 （pre war） period。 The author traces the course of the eastern european machinations and the surprises of the Finnish war with great subtlety and ultimately to great purpose to show Russian duplicity and scheming。 Granted the author undermines this somewhat with his sometimes over the top characterizations of Stalin or the Russians。 Why must one stress the evil verbally if one is showing the reader （and allow us to draw on our conclusions）。 Makes on think that he has a hatchet to bury or just wants to be proactive （the Russians caused the war！） vs。 simply deepening the story and leaving it at that。 In any case， i give it a good review because it is sharing lots of great info about some narrow topics that i didn't know about。 Finally stopped after about the 3rd chapter devoted to how Roosevelt gave away the store during Lend lease and demanded nothing in return！ （when it would have been so easy evidently）。 Not learning anything by this point。 Knee jerk anti stalin history。 Yes， he deserves knee jerk negativity as much as anyone， but it reads like a prosecutor's brief and one feels there may be another side to some of the account but the author just won't go there。 。。。more
Rodrigo Jungmann
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Livro fabuloso。 Mostra quem manipulou tudo desde o início。
Urey Patrick
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The Soviet record in WWII has been thoroughly mythologized。。。 and the deplorable actions of the Soviets/Communists have been white-washed out of existence， often for the political advantage of the Western policies and leaders that enabled and camouflaged the nature of Soviet Communism。。。 a hagiography that haunts us still。 Communism deserves the same opprobrium as does Nazi-ism， for all the same reasons。 Between 1939 and 1941， Hitler’s Germany invaded and conquered seven countries。 So did Stalin The Soviet record in WWII has been thoroughly mythologized。。。 and the deplorable actions of the Soviets/Communists have been white-washed out of existence， often for the political advantage of the Western policies and leaders that enabled and camouflaged the nature of Soviet Communism。。。 a hagiography that haunts us still。 Communism deserves the same opprobrium as does Nazi-ism， for all the same reasons。 Between 1939 and 1941， Hitler’s Germany invaded and conquered seven countries。 So did Stalin’s Soviet Union。 Hitler was executing and enslaving conquered peoples by the tens of thousands – so was Stalin （as he had done prior to the war and would continue to do for years after the war）。 Stalin literally provided the aviation fuel used by the Luftwaffe to bomb London during the Battle of Britain， among a long list of other war materiel and resources that flowed from Russia to Germany until June 1941。 Stalin’s neutrality pact with Germany set the stage for Hitler’s aggression， beginning with Poland。。。 and by design – Stalin intended to incentivize war between the Western capitalists and Germany， weakening them， bleeding them out， and sustaining his own expansionist policies。 His neutrality pact with Japan did the same thing – facilitating Soviet Far Eastern expansionist ambitions while promoting war with the same capitalist powers in the Pacific arena， for the same long term Soviet goals。 And while the West was at war with Japan， Stalin scrupulously was not – arresting and interning Allied flyers who came down in Soviet territory as POWs， for example。 Soviet agents， and representatives， were seeded throughout the Roosevelt administration， a number at very high influential levels （Harry Dexter White， for example） and acted on behalf of the Soviet Union as a higher priority than the interests of the United States and Britain。 The personal hubris and inexplicable naïveté with which FDR confronted Stalin from 1941 to his death in 1945 only made things easier for Stalin， and significantly worse for the US and Britain。 While the US provided literally millions of tons of war supplies， entire factories， food stuffs and strategic materials to the Soviet Union， all at US expense （while Britain had to go bankrupt paying for Lend/Lease materials that were arguably more urgently needed， and yet provided in grudgingly lesser amounts）， Stalin refused to reciprocate in any way， at all。 Western observers were not allowed inside the Soviet Union。 Soviet intelligence was not shared。 No attempt was made to use Lend/Lease or war support as leverage to negotiate more favorable prospects for Allied policies and priorities – the Soviet Union was pandered to， and Stalin’s incessant， and increasing， demands for priority supply and recognition of Soviet policies and intentions were accepted at face value。 It is a damning account – almost unbearable from the perspective of “what might have been” – “how the war might have been ended sooner” and “what lives might have been spared。” It is an account of consistently morally repugnant actions and inexplicable incompetence by the political leaders of the day that have been purposely promoted and embellished ever since。Some of the areas in which the author claims outsized influence by Stalin are， I think， exaggerated within the circumstances – although much of it is not。 For one example， the author argues that the Allies shifted from the campaign up the Italian peninsula to the invasion of western France in large part because Stalin did not want Allied troops anywhere near the lands north of Italy that he intended the Red Army to liberate （and occupy） – but the reality is that the Italian campaign and the mountainous terrain north of Italy through the Alps were not suitable for the grand sweeping assault on fortress Germany necessary to end the war。 Although it did indeed suit Stalin’s strategic purposes for the Allied land effort to shift west to France， it was also the strategically correct thing for the them to do independently of Stalin’s plans。 The other aspect of this book that can get monotonous is the diligent listing of stuff sent by the US to the Soviet Union – in detail。 It is important， but it is so extensive， and so well detailed， that it becomes tedious in the reading – unavoidable， but exhaustive and thus mind-numbing to an extent 。。。 and little to none of which was ever acknowledged by the Soviet Union。 Stalin – as with all totalitarian governments， consistently practiced the policy of “deny everything – make counter-allegations” and it worked， time and again – and it is still working。 This book is hopefully the first serious refutation of the mythology of Soviet actions in WWII， and the detailed， exceptionally well-sourced， refutation of all the “counter-allegations” that have become so much conventional wisdom ever since。 Definitely an indispensable addition to the WWII historical record， and a necessary book to read！ 。。。more
Shane DiGiovanna
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Who Won WWII？This book argues that Stalin was the main orchestrator， manipulator， villain， and victor of the Second World War。 It presents a lot of evidence and definitely changed my perspective on the war， and for that it gets 3。5 （rounded up to 4） stars。 Why not 5 stars？ There’s a difference between presenting an unbiased analysis and argument with evidence， and writing a biased， ideologically slanted argument。 Don’t get me wrong， the author backs everything with evidence and makes a very pers Who Won WWII？This book argues that Stalin was the main orchestrator， manipulator， villain， and victor of the Second World War。 It presents a lot of evidence and definitely changed my perspective on the war， and for that it gets 3。5 （rounded up to 4） stars。 Why not 5 stars？ There’s a difference between presenting an unbiased analysis and argument with evidence， and writing a biased， ideologically slanted argument。 Don’t get me wrong， the author backs everything with evidence and makes a very persuasive argument， but it was not as independent as it should be。 The author is very biased against FDR （and Truman and Churchill to a much lesser extent） as a naive， incompetent fool who got played by the communists。 The author doesn’t seem to understand the complexity of the Western leader’s position， and instead paints FDR with a broad and unfair brush。 Stalin was indisputably one of the two victors of the war （the other is the USA）， and this book does a great job of explaining how and why that happened。 I’m just not sure FDR and the rest of the West were the incompetent， blind fools he portrays them as。3。5/5 stars 。。。more
Haskell Ber
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This is another magisterial volume from McMeekin。 Stalin's War aims to change our preconceptions about the diplomatic dynamic of WWII， in particular， about Soviet foreign policy aims in the West and the East in the late 1930s--early 1940s。 Stalin， according to McMeekin， aimed to exploit the conflicts in Western Europe and in China and the Pacific， with the view of striking both in Europe and Asia when other powers are sufficiently weakened。 The ultimate goal was world domination， achieved by mil This is another magisterial volume from McMeekin。 Stalin's War aims to change our preconceptions about the diplomatic dynamic of WWII， in particular， about Soviet foreign policy aims in the West and the East in the late 1930s--early 1940s。 Stalin， according to McMeekin， aimed to exploit the conflicts in Western Europe and in China and the Pacific， with the view of striking both in Europe and Asia when other powers are sufficiently weakened。 The ultimate goal was world domination， achieved by military might in an old fashioned divide and conquer way。 There are two major tracks in McMeekin's narrative。 One is the detailed and meticulous description of the Soviet policies。 Backed up by numerous archival and academic sources， it is designed to establish the expansionist， calculated， and frankly sinister ambitions of the Soviet regime。 Russian readers are in fact familiar with the main ideas of this argument from Mark Solonin's pioneering research。 Here， they are brought to the next level by the greater scope and sophistication of the discussion。 The other track is the account of naivete and gullibility of the Western powers and， somewhat unexpectedly， Japan。 McMeekin draws an especially damning portrayal of the American officials。 Some of them come out as incompetent Realpolitik craftsmen。 Others are stooges of the Soviet regime。 And the thirds are its agents of influence。 President Truman is an exception， described as a capable statesman with a strong moral backbone。Remarkably， in this 800 page book on a subject I know very well， I haven't been able to locate more than a few infelicities and minor factual inaccuracies。 Among the latter: Purkayev is described as 'Marshal'， whereas in fact he didn't rise above the Army General。 I also have a methodological issue。 McMeekin sometimes writes as though Stalin was the only agent in charge of Soviet policies。 Now， it may be that he *was* in fact the only source of agency and power in the USSR by the late 1930s （see Khlevniuk's research）。 Still， this can't be literally true in every case。 Even if Stalin signed off on procurement and similar decisions （did he？ McMeekin's evidence， while usually solid， is sometimes ambiguous on individual procurement decisions）， he had to follow the advice of his military officials who initiated the moves in the first place， too。 Which brings us to another large question: could we credit Stalin with a conscious， coherent formulation of a strategic plan， as McMeekin and Russian historians like Solonin would have us believe？ Or was there rather mostly vague thinking and opportunistic moves， enabled， no doubt， by the frequent bouts of incompetence （or worse） of Western leaders， Hitler， and internal rivals？McMeekin's narrative， despite the way it is framed （or advertised） as a big provocative argument， suggests a mixture of strategy and accident。 Stalin had plans， which sometimes came off， sometimes not， and when they did it was often owing to the incompetence of his enemies---and his supposed British and American Allies。 In a world governed predominantly by chance and not human design， it is harder to craft riveting narratives like this one。 Grand plans like Stalin's， to expand tne boundaries of Communism， or Hitler's （eg invading the USSR or perpetrating the Holocaust） are more contingent and improvised than premeditated， and when there are such plans， they are often opaque and not always followed through according to conscious design， anyway。 Instead， opportunism， leavened by cruelty， incompetence， happenstance and sheer bureaucratic momentum， drive events。 This leaves less room for a coherent narrative and moral judgement。 And history， when told in this rich but contradictory way， is less useful for understanding the present and predicting the future。 I guess we are left with more questions than answers， but this is what one wants from a good book。 。。。more
Dave Collier
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Author has an incredible intellect and his style is so modern and captivating。 As a reader of many World War II history books and books on politics in general of the timeframe 1930s and 40s this one is special because it’s fresh。 No pop culture diatracting stuff just clarity and insight flowing from a very strong mind。 The theme of Stalin being the arch enemy has been too crowded out by Hitler and his despicable crimes。 But Stalin was the greater murderer。 It’s important to know this because tot Author has an incredible intellect and his style is so modern and captivating。 As a reader of many World War II history books and books on politics in general of the timeframe 1930s and 40s this one is special because it’s fresh。 No pop culture diatracting stuff just clarity and insight flowing from a very strong mind。 The theme of Stalin being the arch enemy has been too crowded out by Hitler and his despicable crimes。 But Stalin was the greater murderer。 It’s important to know this because totalitarians and communists can’t resist murdering on a vast scale for long。 It remains relevant for our age。 。。。more
Charles Coffin
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Outstanding book。 Exceptionally researched。 The author's use of source material is very inconvenient to FDR jocksniffers。 I expect many 1 star reviews in the coming days as The Leftist Hivemind begins to realize how devastating this book is to one of their most beloved sacred cows。 The information on Harry Hopkins is stomach turning to say the least。 Not to mention the NYTimes involvement in selling the Soviet cause。 It's no wonder the modern day Leftist relies so heavily on paranoid projection Outstanding book。 Exceptionally researched。 The author's use of source material is very inconvenient to FDR jocksniffers。 I expect many 1 star reviews in the coming days as The Leftist Hivemind begins to realize how devastating this book is to one of their most beloved sacred cows。 The information on Harry Hopkins is stomach turning to say the least。 Not to mention the NYTimes involvement in selling the Soviet cause。 It's no wonder the modern day Leftist relies so heavily on paranoid projection over Russian influence in America。 They are merely running cover for their generational devotion to promoting the so called Collective。 This book will be on The Left's Ban List very shortly。 Read it before you can't。 。。。more
Minato
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A must read for understanding WW2。
Dan
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My thanks to NetGalley and Perseus Books for an advanced copy of this book。Stalin's War by Sean McMeekin offers a new and different take for the origins of the Second World War。 What if the grand megalomaniac who wanted and needed the War to further his aims of world domination was not in Nazi Germany， but further to the east in Soviet Russia。 Using new research from Russian， European and American sources the author posits that the seeds of the war started further to the East and in the Pacific， My thanks to NetGalley and Perseus Books for an advanced copy of this book。Stalin's War by Sean McMeekin offers a new and different take for the origins of the Second World War。 What if the grand megalomaniac who wanted and needed the War to further his aims of world domination was not in Nazi Germany， but further to the east in Soviet Russia。 Using new research from Russian， European and American sources the author posits that the seeds of the war started further to the East and in the Pacific， way before Adolf Hitler was even in power。 Stalin wanted a world in chaos and at war to further his own dreams of one world！d under Communism， and worked with anyone he could even stated his enemies。 There is much blaming of the West both for appeasing and building up the Soviet forces to fight and later allowing them territory stretching from a divided Berlin to the Pacific。Call it a reassessment or revisionist history， the book is well written and heavily researched。 The ideas might not be to all readers liking， but good history books should always make a reader want to know more and to think about things in different ways。 A nice gift for Father's Day or a graduation gift that could lead to some interesting conversations。 。。。more
Ashley Tyler
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Thank you NetGalley， author Sean McMeekin， and Basic Books for giving me a free E-Arc of this book in exchange for an honest review。 All thoughts and opinions are my own。3 starsThis book is an in-depth account of the events that led up to the rise of the dictator Stalin as well as his role during WWII。 This book was well researched and had gave the reader another insight into the inner workings of Stalin's battle strategies and designs in the Asian theater。 The author used a lot of evidence to a Thank you NetGalley， author Sean McMeekin， and Basic Books for giving me a free E-Arc of this book in exchange for an honest review。 All thoughts and opinions are my own。3 starsThis book is an in-depth account of the events that led up to the rise of the dictator Stalin as well as his role during WWII。 This book was well researched and had gave the reader another insight into the inner workings of Stalin's battle strategies and designs in the Asian theater。 The author used a lot of evidence to allow the reader to draw certain conclusions by going through the events that lead up to， during and the aftermath of WWII from Stalin's actions and Russia。 Many authors use Hitler as the pinnacle player during WWII and often write their books from the German battle strategies and actions and give little insights into Stalin's involvement。 This book was a fresh insight into WWII and other major people and events。 Overall， this book was kept my interest and I am interested to see how this book will be received by other historians！ 。。。more
Grouchy Historian
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This is also one of those rare books that I would give 6 stars if I could。 Like Richard B。 Frank’s Tower of Skulls it will totally change your perspective on World War 2。 If you thought Stalin and the Soviets were a bunch of lying， murderous， opportunistic bastards， this book will definitely confirm that。 But evil is not stupid and Stalin was a master manipulator and geo-strategist。 Read this book。 Do it。 Even if you think you know a lot about World War 2。 It will make you go-“Ah。 Now that （inse This is also one of those rare books that I would give 6 stars if I could。 Like Richard B。 Frank’s Tower of Skulls it will totally change your perspective on World War 2。 If you thought Stalin and the Soviets were a bunch of lying， murderous， opportunistic bastards， this book will definitely confirm that。 But evil is not stupid and Stalin was a master manipulator and geo-strategist。 Read this book。 Do it。 Even if you think you know a lot about World War 2。 It will make you go-“Ah。 Now that （insert event） makes sense。” 。。。more
Xiang Li
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It's ridiculous to see the hurrahs for the book。 I've read more books on the WW2 origins than most people and have a large collection of books on the topic （I would recommend Bell， Taylor， Overy， Watt and Buchanan as best of the bunch）。 I can assert that no serious historians would attribute the WW2 origin to Stalin （he might has his share of blame for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact， but that is just one of many events leading to the outbreak）。 The role of Stalin/Russia in the summer of 1939 has be It's ridiculous to see the hurrahs for the book。 I've read more books on the WW2 origins than most people and have a large collection of books on the topic （I would recommend Bell， Taylor， Overy， Watt and Buchanan as best of the bunch）。 I can assert that no serious historians would attribute the WW2 origin to Stalin （he might has his share of blame for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact， but that is just one of many events leading to the outbreak）。 The role of Stalin/Russia in the summer of 1939 has been well researched by Jabara Carley in his "1939: The Alliance That Never Was" - and he put more blame on the Britain for the failure of a British-France-Russia alliance which sure would stop the war。 。。。more
Rkka
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Looks like McMeekin is still upset that Adolf didn't get to conquer all of Poland in '39， which was no military barrier to a German attack on USSR。 The German General Staff， Admiral Sir Reginald Drax， the head of the British military delegation to the August 1939 Anglo-French-Soviet military staff talks in Moscow， and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the British Armed Forces all agreed that Polish army would be quickly cut to pieces by a German attack， without immediate Soviet military assistance， Looks like McMeekin is still upset that Adolf didn't get to conquer all of Poland in '39， which was no military barrier to a German attack on USSR。 The German General Staff， Admiral Sir Reginald Drax， the head of the British military delegation to the August 1939 Anglo-French-Soviet military staff talks in Moscow， and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the British Armed Forces all agreed that Polish army would be quickly cut to pieces by a German attack， without immediate Soviet military assistance， which the Polish government would not even discuss accepting。And it was it was， before the Red Army moved an inch。 。。。more
Jean-Luc
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Sean McMeekin's Stalin's war is a lengthy but thoroughly fascinating revisionist analysis of the Russian dictator's role and responsibilities within the gigantic spiderweb of WWII。It is unquestionable today that Josef Stalin was the lone actor who allowed Hitler to unleash his powerful military firepower upon Europe in 1939 after signing the Brest-Litovsk non-aggression pact， allaying the latter's fears of a possible war on two fronts。 There is no doubt that Stalin was as much to blame as Hitler Sean McMeekin's Stalin's war is a lengthy but thoroughly fascinating revisionist analysis of the Russian dictator's role and responsibilities within the gigantic spiderweb of WWII。It is unquestionable today that Josef Stalin was the lone actor who allowed Hitler to unleash his powerful military firepower upon Europe in 1939 after signing the Brest-Litovsk non-aggression pact， allaying the latter's fears of a possible war on two fronts。 There is no doubt that Stalin was as much to blame as Hitler was for setting the house on fire。But by early 1940， Josef seemed to have been taken unawares by the speed of the German successes and he started to doubt Russia's abilities to control the Teutonic firewall raging across the continent。 Unfortunately he had only himself to blame。 If Stalin hadn't purged the top Russian military ranks in the 30s， his armed forces would have been better prepared to deal with the catastrophic situation Hitler created。 His actions before the war definitely weakened Russia's abilities to mount any sweeping operations against Germany worth writing home about。 The tide only changed when the Germans were stupid enough to invade Russia with all the tragic consequences we all know so well。。。It's only after the Hitlerian debacle in Russia that Stalin finally emerged as a powerful player to be reckoned with。 He started to put forward his grand diplomatic vision for a postwar Soviet Union and its place among the winners。 From the 1943 conference in Theran to Yalta & Postdam two years later， he never stop to put forward a bullying diplomatic approach that Roosevelt & Churchill had to eventually accept。 It definitely secured an important place to the Soviet Union on the world stage after 1945 and paved the way towards the Cold War。 Stalin won the day。This book is a brilliant study about Russia during WWII and a well researched look at world diplomacy at the end of the conflict and the chaotic birth of a new world order。 Muchas Gracias Mr。 McMeekin for the wonderful hours I spent with your book👍👍Many thanks to Netgalley and Basic Books for giving me the opportunity to read this wonderful book prior to its release date 。。。more
Руслан
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Definitely a book that needs to be read。 I read it in advance， but I believe it will arouse great interest。 The very idea of presenting World War II through the face and strategies of Stalin is something new in the field in the way developed by the author。 I also believe that the book will provoke mixed reactions， including negative ones， as Stalin has supporters even in the 21st century who are gaining visibility。
Marsha
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For those who think of World War II as that noble fight of good against evil， this thoroughly sourced book will be a rude awakening。 McMeekin details the inspiration and practical tips that Stalin and Hitler got from each other， and also their many ways of collaborating and staying out of each others' way in the 1930s。 Even Stalin's antisemitism rivals Hitler's。 The allies thought they won by defeating Hitler， but meanwhile their fellow ally Stalin established a vast slave empire under their nos For those who think of World War II as that noble fight of good against evil， this thoroughly sourced book will be a rude awakening。 McMeekin details the inspiration and practical tips that Stalin and Hitler got from each other， and also their many ways of collaborating and staying out of each others' way in the 1930s。 Even Stalin's antisemitism rivals Hitler's。 The allies thought they won by defeating Hitler， but meanwhile their fellow ally Stalin established a vast slave empire under their noses。 Stalin was playing chess while everyone else was playing checkers。 If you want to understand Putin's long-game， look no further than his patron-devil。 。。。more
Biblio Files （takingadayoff）
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